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Abstract
Background:  Payment  mechanisms  for  health  care  providers  have  been  used  as  a  strategy  to
improve management,  health  indicators,  cost  containment,  equity  and  efﬁciency.  Among  the
mechanisms  implemented  in  the  past  decade  is  pay-for-performance  (P4P).  In  Chile,  it  was
incorporated  since  2003  in  primary  care  in  addition  to  the  salary  by  seniority  and  training.
Objectives:  To  assess  the  impact  of  P4P  on  the  efﬁciency  of  primary  oral  health  care  providers
in Chile.
Methods:  We  performed  a  retrospective  cohort  study  to  compare  the  performance  of  oral
healthcare  practices  belonging  to  primary  health  providers  measured  by  the  rate  of  dental
discharge  in  6  year-old  children  between  years  in  which  P4P  was  used  and  years  in  which  P4P
was not  used,  in  the  52  municipalities  of  the  Metropolitan  Region  of  Chile.  We  also  explored
whether rurality,  and  the  human  development  index  (HDI)  had  an  association  with  the  efﬁ-
ciency of  health  care  teams.  We  calculated  the  rate  of  discharge  per  1000  patients,  and  its
adjusted and  unadjusted  association  with  the  predictors  of  interest,  using  a  Random-effects
Poisson regression.
Results:  We  found  statistically  signiﬁcant  differences  in  the  rate  of  dental  discharges  when
comparing  P4P  versus  no  P4P  (822.59/1000  and  662.59/1000,  respectively,  p  <  0.0001)  and  high
versus low  HDI  (692.23/1000  and  832.85/1000,  respectively,  p  =  0.01).  Rurality  was  not  sta-
tistically associated  with  P4P  (727.24/1000  in  rural  and  770.19/1000  in  urban  municipalities,
adjusted  rate  ratios  were  very  similar.p =  0.553).  Unadjusted  and  ∗ Corresponding author.
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Conclusions:  P4P  ﬁnancial  incentives  can  improve  the  performance  of  primary  care  dental  prac-
tices, and  seem  to  be  useful  interventions  to  improve  the  performance  of  oral  health  care
providers.
© 2015  Sociedad  de  Periodoncia  de  Chile,  Sociedad  de  Implantología  Oral  de
Chile y  Sociedad  de  Prótesis  y  Rehabilitación  Oral  de  Chile.  Published  by  Else-
vier España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY-NC-ND  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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Pago  por  desempen˜o  y  eﬁcacia  de  las  prácticas  de  atención  sanitaria  primaria  oral  en
Chile
Resumen
Antecedentes:  Se  han  venido  utilizando  mecanismos  de  pago  a  los  profesionales  de  la  atención
sanitaria para  mejorar  la  gestión,  los  indicadores  sanitarios,  la  contención  de  costes,  la  equidad
y la  eﬁcacia.  Entre  los  mecanismos  introducidos  en  el  último  decenio  se  encuentra  el  pago  por
desempen˜o- pay  for  performance  (P4P).  En  Chile,  se  lleva  incorporando  a  la  atención  primaria
desde 2003,  además  del  salario  por  antigüedad  y  la  formación.
Objetivos:  Evaluar  el  impacto  del  P4P  sobre  la  eﬁcacia  de  los  profesionales  de  la  atención
sanitaria oral  primaria  en  Chile.
Métodos:  Realizamos  el  estudio  comparativo  de  un  grupo,  para  comparar  el  desempen˜o  de  las
prácticas de  los  cuidados  sanitarios  orales  de  los  profesionales  de  la  salud  primaria,  medido
mediante  el  índice  de  las  altas  dentales  en  nin˜os  de  seis  an˜os,  entre  los  an˜os  en  que  se  utilizó
el P4P  y  los  an˜os  en  que  no,  en  cincuenta  y  dos  municipios  de  la  región  metropolitana  de  Chile.
También exploramos  si  la  ruralidad  y  el  índice  de  desarrollo  humano  (IDH)  estaban  asociados  a  la
eﬁcacia de  los  equipos  de  atención  sanitaria.  Calculamos  el  índice  de  altas  por  1000  pacientes,
y su  asociación  ajustada  y  no  ajustada  a  los  predictores  del  interés,  utilizando  el  modelo  de
regresión  de  los  efectos  aleatorios  de  Poisson.
Resultados:  Encontramos  diferencias  estadísticamente  signiﬁcativas  en  el  índice  de  altas
dentales al  comparar  P4P  frente  a  no  P4P  (822,59/1000  y  662,59/1000,  respectivamente,
p <  0,0001),  y  el  elevado  frente  al  bajo  IDH  (692,23/1000  y  832,85/1000,  respectivamente,
p =  0,01).  La  ruralidad  no  estuvo  estadísticamente  asociada  al  P4P  (727,24/1000  en  municipios
rurales y  770,19/1000  en  municipios  urbanos,  p  =  0,553).  Los  ratios  no  ajustados  y  ajustados
fueron muy  similares.
Conclusiones:  Las  incentivas  ﬁnancieras  P4P  pueden  mejorar  el  desempen˜o  de  las  prácticas
de atención  primaria  dental,  y  parecen  resultar  unas  intervenciones  útiles  para  mejorar  el
desempen˜o de  los  profesionales  de  la  atención  sanitaria  oral.
© 2015  Sociedad  de  Periodoncia  de  Chile,  Sociedad  de  Implantología  Oral  de
Chile y  Sociedad  de  Prótesis  y  Rehabilitación  Oral  de  Chile.  Publicado  por  Else-
vier España,  S.L.U.  Este  es  un  artículo  Open  Access  bajo  la  licencia  CC  BY-NC-ND
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Introduction
Oral  health  is  recognized  as  an  important  component  of
the  overall  health  of  individuals  and  the  community.  Socio-
economic  inequality  in  children’s  oral  health  exists  within
developed  countries  and  between  countries  with  differ-
ent  levels  of  development.1 Population  programs  aimed
at  improving  upstream  factors  are  of  priority  for  further
improving  children’s  oral  health  in  different  populations.1
In  this  context,  dental  care  has  been  incorporated  into  the
service  portfolio  of  the  health  systems  of  many  countries.2
This  has  resulted  in  an  increase  or  redistribution  of  resources
allocation  in  the  health  ﬁeld  in  order  to  extend  the  coverage
of  dental  services.3,4
Payment  mechanisms  for  health  care  providers  have  been
used  in  different  environments  as  a  strategy  to  improve
management,  health  indicators,  cost  containment,  and
c
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ecenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
fﬁciency.2 Among  the  most  used  to  reimburse  healthcare
roviders  are  fee-for-service  (FFS)  and  capitation.  Litera-
ure  links  FFS  to  higher  productivity  but  also  to  perverse
ncentives  toward  over-treatment.5 The  per  capita  fund-
ng  mechanism  encourages  cost  containment,  coordination
etween  health  providers  and  greater  equity  in  the  alloca-
ion  of  resources.6
In  the  context  of  the  health  reform,  Chile  has  imple-
ented  and  deepened  a  series  of  transformations  aimed  at
mproving  the  efﬁciency  and  equity  in  the  health  system.4
ne  strategy  has  been  to  incorporate  new  payment  mech-
nisms  as  a  tool  to  ameliorate  the  management  and  health
ndicators,  and  to  help  contain  costs  and  improve  efﬁ-
iency.  Since  1990,  the  capitation  mechanism  ﬁnanced
rimary  Health  Care  in  Chile.  It  consists  in  transferring
overnment  contributions  to  the  primary  care  management
ntities.4
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In  the  secondary  analyses,  we  explored  the  association
between  the  rate  of  discharge  and  the  other  predictors  of
interest.  In  those  analyses,  ﬁxed  effects  for  rurality  and  the2  
Meanwhile,  in  the  international  context,  a  payment
echanism  called  ‘‘Pay  for  Performance’’  (P4P)  was
ntroduced  in  the  past  decade.7 It  is  an  evolution  of  fee-for-
ervices8 deﬁned  as  the  transfer  of  money  or  material  goods
onditional  on  taking  a  measurable  action  or  achieving  a  pre-
etermined  performance  target.9 P4P  rewards  health  care
roviders  in  exchange  for  compliance  with  generally  prede-
ned  objectives  in  terms  of  quality  and  efﬁciency  of  care.8
ome  P4P  schemes  pay  doctors,  teams  of  health  profession-
ls  or  hospitals  directly  on  the  basis  of  multiple  indicators.
azear10 links  P4P  and  productivity.  It  can  also  be  based  on
ndicators  of  structure,  process  and/or  outcomes,  evaluat-
ng  providers  regarding  quality  parameters  or  compared  with
ther  providers.
In  Chile,  since  2003  Primary  Health  Care  (PHC)  teams
rom  municipal  establishments  started  receiving  additional
oney  as  P4P,  in  addition  to  the  salary  according  to  senior-
ty  and  training,  depending  on  the  collective  compliance
f  performance  indicators  deﬁned  under  technical  criteria
nd  negotiated  in  tripartite  committees  composed  of  repre-
entatives  of  PHC  Municipal  Entities  administrators,  unions
epresenting  the  workers  and  the  Ministry  of  Health.  Accord-
ng  to  the  degree  of  compliance  of  the  goals,  the  P4P  implied
 percent  increase  of  remuneration  that  varied  between
--10%  at  the  beginning  and  10--21%  by  2010  (Table  1).
In  the  dental  care  ﬁeld,  the  percentage  of  pregnant
omen,  6  year-old,  and  12  year-old  children  with  den-
al  discharges  were  established  as  performance  indicators.
owever  the  Health  Authority  decided  excluding  oral  health
are  for  6  year-old  children  from  the  P4P  scheme  in  the  years
007--2008  because  these  services  joined  the  Explicit  Health
uarantees  scheme  (Garantías  explícitas  en  salud  --  GES).4
s  a  consequence,  it  was  informally  observed  that  dental  dis-
harges  in  6  year-old  children  markedly  decreased.  Thereby,
ral  health  care  for  this  population  was  reinstated  to  P4P
cheme  again  since  2009  and  oral  healthcare  providers  were
ncentived  again  for  that.
Use  of  ﬁnancial  incentives  to  directly  reward  ‘perfor-
ance’  and  ‘quality’  in  primary  care  is  increasing  in  a
umber  of  countries.11 However,  there  are  few  studies  on
ncentives  based  remuneration  within  dentistry  and  also
here  is  a  lack  of  studies  regarding  the  effects  of  a  P4P  on  pri-
ary  medical  and  dental  care.12,13 Thus  this  study  aimed  to
escribe  one  of  the  few  experiences  of  implementing  P4P  to
ay  dentists  in  developing  country  and  to  evaluate  the  asso-
iation  between  P4P  and  the  efﬁciency  of  Chilean  primary
are  dentists.
aterials and methods
esign  and  study  population
n  this  retrospective  cohort  study,  we  reviewed  the  records
f  dental  discharges  over  a  period  of  5  years  in  6  year-old
hildren,  and  compared  the  rate  of  discharge  between  the
ears  in  which  P4P  was  implemented  against  the  rate  when
t  was  not.  The  study  population  consisted  of  oral  health-
are  providers  belonging  to  Primary  Health  Care  Providers
Municipalities)  from  the  Metropolitan  Region  of  Santiago
e  Chile.  We  included  all  52  municipalities  of  the  region
which  concentrate  over  40%  of  whole  Chilean  population),
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etween  years  2006  and  2010.  To  avoid  bias,  we  excluded
he  ﬁrst  three  years  of  P4P  (2003--2005)  because  although
he  legal  framework  established  P4P  regimen  since  2003,
his  was  made  effective  only  since  2006.  In  addition,  it  was
ot  until  this  year  that  all  municipalities  across  the  region
ad  comparable  infrastructure  and  staff  conditions.  Then
003--2005  was  as  a  preparatory  phase,  when  details  of  the
orthcoming  incentivised  targets  were  in  the  public  domain
ut  were  not  yet  measured.
ata  source
fﬁcial  records  from  the  Oral  Health  Department  of  the
ealth  Ministry  of  Chile  grouping  dental  discharges  data  of
ll  communes.
utcome
he  outcome  of  interest  was  performance  measured  as
fﬁciency,14 deﬁned  as  the  rate  of  discharge  of  6  year-old
er  1000  patients.  Data  to  inform  this  outcome  was  obtained
or  each  municipality,  per  year.
redictors
he  main  predictor  of  interest  was  P4P.  In  each  municipal-
ty,  there  were  data  regarding  three  years  in  which  P4P  was
sed  (2006,  2009,  2010),  and  two  years  in  which  P4P  was  not
sed  (2007,  2008).  Secondary  predictors  of  interest  were  the
eographic  location  (whether  the  municipality  was  rural  or
rban,  as  measured  by  the  percentage  of  rural  population
n  each  municipality),  and  Human  Development  Index  (HDI)
whether  the  municipality  had  a  HDI  over  or  under  the  region
edian,  according  to  the  2003  measurement).
tatistical  analysis
n  order  to  describe  the  data  and  the  results,  we  calcu-
ated  the  rate  of  discharge  per  1000  patients.  We  started
y  calculating  the  rate  of  discharge  using  the  number  of
atients  discharged  and  the  total  population  per  munici-
ality,  per  year.  Then,  we  pooled  these  rates  together  as
etailed  below.  In  addition,  we  calculated  the  adjusted  and
nadjusted  rate  ratio  of  discharge,  according  to  the  predic-
ors  of  interest.
To  explore  the  association  between  the  rate  of  discharge
nd  P4P,  we  used  a Random-effects  Poisson  regression.  In
his  analysis,  the  ﬁxed  effects  corresponded  to  the  effects
f  payment  regimen,  and  a  random  effect  for  accounting
or  the  fact  that  each  municipality  contributed  with  data
or  each  of  the  ﬁve  years  was  used.DI  below  the  median  were  included.
For  determining  the  association  between  the  rate  of  dis-
harge  and  each  of  the  predictors,  a  Wald  test  was  used.
he  level  of  signiﬁcance  was  set  at  0.05.
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Table  1  First  and  second  payment  schemes  according  to  collective  performance  showing  incentives  based  reimbursement  given
in gradually  over  a  period  of  four  years,  according  to  the  following  schedule,  Chile  2003--2010.
Fixed  component  (%)  Variable  component  (%)
Years  of  the  ﬁrst  scheme
2003  2.65  0.0
2004 3.5  Up  to1.8
2005 4.4  Up  to  3.5
2006 5.3  Up  to  5.3
Fixed
component  (%)
Compliance  of  90%  or
more  of  the  targets
Compliance  between  75%
and 89%  of  the  targets
Years  of  the  second  scheme
2007  6.7  7.0  3.5
2008 8.0  8.6  4.3
2009 9.2 10.2 5.1
2010  10.3 11.9 5.95
 and 19,813. Available at http://www.leychile.cl/Navegar?idNorma=
statistically  signiﬁcantly  different  although  slightly  lower  in
rural  municipalities.
We  consider  that  these  results  are  relevant  from  a  public
health  perspective,  and  useful  to  justify  the  use  of  incen-
tives.  We  agree  with  Voinea-Grifﬁn  et  al.,13 as  P4P  could  be
an  strategy  to  improve  efﬁciency  for  paying  primary  care
dental  practices  and  performance  of  dental  staff.
Table  2  Main  characteristics  of  municipalities  of  Chile
(2006--2010).
Characteristics  of  municipalities
Total  number  of  municipalities  52
Total number  of  years
P4P  3
No P4P  2
Municipalities  according  to  geographic  location
Rural 13  (25%)
Urban  39  (75%)
Median  IDH  0.73
Mean rate  of  discharge  per  1000
patients
759.3/1000
Mean  SD
Mean  annual  number  of  6  year-old  children  old
per municipality:
Global  2006--2010  1321  1464
Years  with  P4P
(2006,  2009,
2010)
1313  1391
Years  without  P4P 1334  1576Source:  Library of the National Parliament of Chile. Laws 19,378
257041&idParte=8020612&idVersion=2007-01-05.
All  analyses  were  done  using  the  software  R  (Core  Team,
R  Foundation  for  Statistical  Computing).
Results
Characteristics  of  the  study  population
The  total  of  52  municipalities  had  dental  discharge  data
available  during  the  5  years  of  this  study  (Table  2).  The  over-
all  mean  rate  of  discharge  was  759.3  per  1000  patients.  This
rate  was  very  variable  among  municipalities.  The  lowest  rate
of  discharge  observed  was  116.92/1000,  whereas  the  highest
rate  of  discharge  observed  was  2467.67/1000  patients.
Table  3  shows  that  the  mean  rate  of  discharge  was
statistically  signiﬁcantly  higher  when  the  payment  for  per-
formance  regimen  was  used,  and  when  the  municipality  had
a  HDI  index  lower  than  the  region  median.  Even  though
not  statistically  signiﬁcant,  the  mean  rate  of  discharge  was
lower  in  rural  wards.  However,  these  results  have  remark-
able  implications  in  Public  Health  which  we  will  discuss  later.
Table  3  also  shows  the  association  between  the  rate  of  dis-
charge  and  the  predictors  of  interest  in  terms  of  the  rate
ratio,  and  its  95%  conﬁdence  interval.  The  adjusted  ratios
are  very  similar  to  the  unadjusted  ones.  On  average,  when
payment  for  performance  is  implemented,  there  is  a  24%
increase  in  the  rate  of  discharge  of  patients,  when  com-
pared  to  the  period  of  time  that  this  payment  regimen  is
not  used.
Discussion
Among  our  main  ﬁndings,  P4P  payment  mechanism  impacted
the  rate  of  dental  discharge  in  6  year-old  Chilean  popu-
lation.  We  observed  that  the  rate  of  discharge  increased,
on  average,  in  160  per  1000  patients  when  P4P  was  used
when  compared  to  the  years  in  which  it  was  not  used.  We
also  observed  that  there  was  an  association  between  the
rate  of  discharge  and  HDI,  i.e.  municipalities  with  lower  HDI
reached  higher  rates.  The  mean  rate  of  discharge  was  not
(2007,  2008)
P4P: years when pay-for-performance was used; noP4P: years
when pay-for-performance was not used; IDH: human develop-
ment index; SD: standard deviation.
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Table  3  Mean  rate  and  rate  ratio  of  dental  discharges  according  to  the  predictors  of  interest.  Chile  (2006--2010).
Predictor  Unadjusted  Adjusted
Mean  rate  of
discharge  (per
1000  patients)
p  value
(comparison  of
the two  rates) Rate  ratio  95%  CI  Rate  ratio  95%  CI
Payment  regimen
P4P  822.59  <0.0001  1.24  1.23;  1.25  1.24  1.23;  1.25
No P4P  662.59
Geographic  location:  rurality
Yes  727.24  0.553  0.94  0.78;  1.14  0.92  0.77;  1.10
No 770.19
HDI
High  692.23 0.01 1.20 1.03;  1.41 1.21 1.04;  1.42
Low 832.85
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In  a  recent  review  that  aimed  to  assess  the  impact  of
nancial  systems  to  reimburse  dentist,  Johansson  et  al.,6
how  that  capitation  has  a  different  impact  on  provided  care
han  FFS:  it  decreases  restorative  treatment  and  caries  inci-
ence  and  also  increases  preventive  care.  However,  they
ould  not  conclude  anything  regarding  productivity.  Their
tudy  also  suggests  the  need  for  more  research  that  focus
n  efﬁciency.6
Trying  to  contribute  to  tackle  this  shortcoming,  our  study
hows  that  the  method  used  in  Chile  to  reimburse  dentists  in
apitated  environments  increased  the  efﬁciency  compared
hen  paying  uniquely  salary.  Using  blended  schemes  paying
alary  plus  P4P  could  be  a  good  experience,  avoiding  the
isadvantages  of  using  pure  FFS  or  salary.  Besides,  we  agree
ith  Levy  et  al.15 who  suggested  that  a  blended  payment
cheme  for  dentist,  e.g.,  a  combined  method  of  P4P  and
FS  or  P4P  and  salary,  could  result  on  larger  compensation
ange  and  increase  the  incentive  for  improved  productivity
evels.
In  the  Chilean  experience,  capitation  funding  of  Pri-
ary  Health  Care  and  the  salaried  services  foster  a
reventive  approach  to  care  and  are  particularly  suit-
ble  where  care  is  directed  toward  vulnerable  groups
ithin  the  community  (municipalities  with  lower  HDI),  and
lso  discourage  overtreatment.9 Additionally,  P4P  helps  to
ncourage  dentists  to  deliver  patient-centered,  adequate,
fﬁcient  services,  and  value-based  services.16 In  fact,  Gryt-
en  et  al.12 found  that  the  transition  to  an  incentive-based
emuneration  system  led  to  an  increase  in  the  number  of
ndividuals  under  supervision  without  either  a  fall  in  quality
r  a  patient  selection  effect.
ayment  mechanisms  and  pay  for  performance
n  literature,  the  term  P4P  is  also  used  as  performance
ncentives,  results-based  ﬁnancing  and  performance-based
nancing.9 Currently,  P4P  has  received  considerable  atten-
ion  as  an  innovative  model  to  increase  the  efﬁciency
nd  whole  performance  of  health  systems,  as  a  payment
echanism  that  attempts  to  compensate  for  the  undesirable
ffects  of  traditional  payment  mechanisms.9
e
h
my-for-performance was not used; IDH: human development index;
In  relation  to  the  latter,  some  comprehensive  reviews
f  the  literature  about  the  effects  of  different  types  of
emuneration  concluded  that  salary  tend  to  be  better  than
ee-for-service  (FFS)  when  considering  the  global  efﬁciency
f  a  healthcare  system.  Although  our  study  showed  an
ncrease  in  efﬁciency  when  using  salary  plus  P4P  compared
o  only  salary,  the  literature  related  to  the  impact  of  tar-
et  payment  is  inconclusive  to  obtain  a  clear  answer  to
he  question  as  to  whether  target  payment  remuneration
rovides  a method  of  improving  primary  health  care.6,17,18
ately  an  encouraging  ﬁnding  from  Baek  et  al.19 shows
hat  ﬁnancial  incentives  (P4P)  aligned  with  clinic  produc-
ivity/proﬁtability  do  not  to  impede  high-quality  care.19
Regarding  payment  mechanisms  to  dentist,  one  general-
zed  criticism  for  solo  salary  systems,  is  their  lack  of  ﬁnancial
ncentives  toward  productivity.16 On  the  other  hand,  FFS,
idely  used  to  pay  dentist,  is  done  per  service  provided  and
s  linked  to  perverse  incentives  toward  over-treatment.13 So,
n  public  health  systems  where  dentists  are  remunerated  on
 FFS  basis,  many  concerns  arise.  On  this  topic,  a  system  of
ental  remuneration  based  on  piece  work  appears  increas-
ngly  inappropriate  in  the  modern  era.16 Then  blended
ayment  based  on  salary  plus  P4P  would  help  to  optimize
ayment  schemes.
ay  for  performance  and  access  to  oral  health  care
or underprivileged  and  rural  people
ur  results  show  that  the  mean  rate  of  discharge  was  statis-
ically  signiﬁcantly  higher  when  the  P4P  regimen  was  used,
nd  when  the  municipality  had  a  human  development  index
ower  than  the  regional  median.  Even  though  not  statisti-
ally  signiﬁcant,  the  mean  rate  of  discharge  was  slightly
ower  in  rural  wards  compared  to  urban  places.  Nonethe-
ess,  we  consider  that  these  differences  are  relevant  from
he  public  health  perspective,  and  useful  when  policymakers
eed  to  justify  the  use  of  incentives,  like  P4P,  to  improve
fﬁciency  of  dental  staff.
Municipaities  with  lower  HDI  (more  deprived  places),  had
igher  rates  of  discharge.  There  is  evidence  that  people  of
ore  vulnerable  socioeconomic  groups  tend  to  show  worse
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CPay-for-performance  and  efﬁciency  of  public  dental  care  pr
lower  rate  of  visits  to  the  dentist  than  people  with  higher
socioeconomic  level  and  also  have  poorer  oral  health.20
Therefore,  if  we  compare  our  results  with  those  from  stud-
ies  related  to  oral  health  inequalities20 and  the  preliminary
evaluation  of  the  guaranteed  oral  health  delivery  for  6  year-
old  children  in  Chile,20,21 we  can  value  the  importance  of
continuing  with  strategies  to  incentive  higher  efﬁciency  in
dental  practices  and  to  improve  access  to  oral  health  care
in  the  most  vulnerable  groups  of  6  year-old  population.  Thus
we  could  consider  P4P  as  some  of  the  strategies  to  address
inequalities  in  access  and  use  of  dental  services  for  under-
privileged  people.1
One  of  the  social  determinants  of  oral  health  is  the  place
of  residence.  People  who  live  in  rural  places  have  worse
oral  health  status,1,20,21 due  to  the  lack  of  access  to  care,
having  non-ﬂuoridated  water,  and  the  lower  participation
in  prevention  programs  or  low  exposure  to  ﬂuorides  among
other  reasons.22
Epidemiological  studies  demonstrating  the  marked
inequalities  in  oral  health  status  of  the  6  year-old  popu-
lation  in  Chile,21 reported  more  decayed  teeth  in  children
living  in  rural  areas.  This  may  result  in  greater  workloads
to  restore  oral  health  of  the  rural  6  year-old  population.
Then,  it  would  be,  expected  to  ﬁnd  lower  rates  of  dental  dis-
charge  in  rural  places  when  compared  with  dentist  working
in  urban  areas.  However,  considering  our  results  and  assum-
ing  reliability  of  the  dental  records,  we  hypothesize  that  P4P
incentived  better  engagement  and  commitment  for  rural
dentists  and  municipalities  in  order  to  improve  the  access
for  children  and  get  similar  rates  to  those  of  urban  areas.
Furthermore,  we  should  consider  that  the  number  of  profes-
sionals  and  dental  staff  size  are  deﬁned  depending  on  the
beneﬁciary  population’s  size,  without  necessarily  consider-
ing  the  difference  between  the  oral  health  status  of  children
from  urban  and  rural  areas.  Therefore,  we  agree  with  some
authors  who  emphasize  economic  incentives  as  one  of  the
strategies  to  improve  access  to  health  services  in  rural  and
most  vulnerable  areas.23 In  Chile,  rural  municipalities  whose
population  has  had  major  difﬁculties  of  geographical  access
to  health  centers  also  have  been  equipped  with  mobile  den-
tal  clinics  aimed  primarily  at  meeting  the  oral  health  goals
related  to  P4P.  This  could  also  explain  that  no  differences
were  observed  according  to  geographical  location.
Some  issues  related  to  the  implementation  of  pay
for performance  and  dentistry
Incentive  schemes  should  be  more  carefully  designed  before
implementation.11 Tickle  et  al.24 reported  that  the  intro-
duction  of  changes  in  the  incentive  structure  for  dentists
in  England  coincided  with  large  and  abrupt  changes  in  the
provision  of  the  dental  treatments.  So,  policymakers  and
stakeholders  involved  in  oral  health  care  provision  should
consider  that  changes  to  ﬁnancial  incentive  structures  might
produce  changes  in  professional  behaviors.  Also,  motives
and  objectives  of  professionals  do  not  always  agree  with
public  health,  then,  more  thought  should  be  given  to  poli-
cies  to  change  payment  structures  to  mitigate  unwanted
incentives.
Therefore,  we  agree  with  Voinea-Grifﬁn  et  al.,25 and  we
think  that  P4P  implementation  should  be  complemented
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ith  other  indicators  of  quality  performance  in  dentistry.
or  example,  Grytten  et  al.  propose  to  use  extensive  clinical
nd  radiological  data  on  quality  before  and  after  providing
ental  care.12 Other  studies  also  propose  that  the  results
n  dentists  and  patients  satisfaction  and  also  the  poten-
ial  unintended  consequences  of  incentive  schemes  should
e  assessed  when  P4P  is  implemented  in  dentistry,12,14,26 by
ncluding  a broader  range  of  outcomes.11
trengths  and  limitations
mong  the  strengths  of  this  study  there  is  the  data  collec-
ion  process.  Complete  data  were  obtained  from  a  reliable
ource,  i.e.  statistical  records  from  Ministry  of  Health.  In
ddition,  it  is  worth  noticing  that  people  from  the  Metropoli-
an  Región  (Santiago  de  Chile)  account  for  more  than  40%  of
he  population  of  country.
Some  municipalities  provide  dental  care  based  on  the
umber  of  6  year-old  children  studying  in  the  district,  many
f  which,  based  on  geographical  capitation  funding  of  pri-
ary  health  care  level,  are  registered  in  primary  health  care
roviders  belonging  to  another  municipalities  with  fewer
ducational  offer.  Therefore,  those  children  must  attend
stablishments  from  other  municipalities.  Thus  the  major
imitation  is  that  some  children  were  living  in  a  municipality
ut  were  treated  in  another  (e.g.,  they  were  in  the  numera-
or  of  a  municipality  and  in  the  denominator  of  another).
his  may  cause  inaccurate  evaluation  of  the  association
etween  the  characteristics  of  rurality  and  vulnerability  of
he  municipalities  and  the  rate  of  discharges.  However  there
as  no  way  of  assessing  and  estimating  this  effect  because
here  is  no  data  to  quantify  this  phenomenon  in  Chile.
There  may  be  problems  of  dual  registration  and  audit
ata  that  overestimate  dental  discharges  in  years  with  P4P.
espite  this,  we  used  the  best  data  we  could  get.  The  accu-
acy  of  the  records  is  an  issue  that  should  be  evaluated  in
nother  study.
Considering  that  in  September  of  each  year  targets  for
he  following  year  are  published,  the  impact  of  exclud-
ng  P4P  on  decreasing  of  the  rate  of  dental  discharges  in
007  may  be  underestimated  due  to  a  cumulative  effect
rom  2006.  Similarly,  in  2008  the  discharge  rates  might  be
lso  underestimated  by  projections  of  dental  discharges  for
009.
Finally  we  must  consider  that  the  results  could  also  be
ttributed  in  part  to  greater  empowerment  of  the  popula-
ion  in  the  use  of  guaranteed  oral  health  care.
onclusion
inancial  incentives  related  to  pay  for  performance  can
mprove  the  efﬁciency  of  primary  care  dental  teams  in  Chile.
his  effect  was  far  clearer  in  municipalities  with  lower  HDI.
his  payment  mechanism  seems  to  be  a  useful  to  improve
he  performance  of  oral  health  care  providers.
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